Who Can Actually Deliver Australia’s Housing Promises?

Housing has become one of Australia’s most urgent political issues.

Governments and political parties regularly announce ambitious targets, planning reforms, tax concessions, public-housing programs and new assistance for purchasers. The numbers are often impressive, and the language is invariably confident.

But announcing homes is not the same as approving them. Approving homes is not the same as financing them. And none of those activities necessarily results in a completed home with roads, water, sewerage, transport and community services.

With the Victorian state election scheduled for 28 November 2026, voters will hear increasingly confident claims about which party can solve—or at least reduce—the housing crisis.

The real question is not which party can make the largest promise.

It is:

Which party has a housing policy that can actually be delivered?

Housing is a system, not an announcement

State governments exert considerable influence over housing. They control planning legislation, property taxes, public housing, infrastructure investment and much of the land-release process.

But they do not control everything.

The Commonwealth influences migration, taxation, banking regulation and national housing funding. Councils administer many local planning processes. Banks determine whether projects and purchasers can obtain finance. Private developers, builders and tradespeople construct most of the homes.

A state government can rezone land, but it cannot make a builder commence a commercially unviable project. It can approve an apartment development, but it cannot guarantee sufficient presales or development finance. It can announce a housing target, but it cannot instantly create skilled workers, serviced land or construction materials.

Every party’s housing policy should therefore be examined against several practical questions:

• How will it be funded?

• Is sufficient serviced land available?

• Can projects obtain finance?

• Are there enough construction workers?

• What infrastructure will new communities require?

• How long will approvals, procurement and construction take?

• Does the policy encourage completed homes—or merely announcements and theoretical capacity?

These questions provide a more useful test than political slogans.

Labor: the most developed plan—but is it working?

The Victorian Labor Government has the advantage and disadvantage of a record that can be examined.

Its Housing Statement and Plan for Victoria include a target of 800,000 additional homes between 2024 and 2034, followed by a longer-term objective of 2.24 million homes by 2051.

The Government intends approximately 70% of new housing to be built in established areas, with greater density around public transport, employment and existing services. It has introduced planning reforms, accelerated approval pathways, off-the-plan stamp-duty concessions, renter protections and local housing targets.

Labor has also committed more than $5.3 billion to its Big Housing Build, with wider social and affordable housing investment now exceeding $8 billion.

This is a substantial housing agenda. Labor cannot reasonably be accused of having no plan.

The harder question is whether the plan is producing enough completed housing.

The Victorian Auditor-General found that the Big Housing Build was on course to deliver more than 12,000 homes within budget. Approximately 80% were expected to be completed on time, while the remainder could be as much as three years late.

The same review found that Victoria’s total social-housing stock had remained broadly steady between 2017 and 2023, despite increasing demand. It also concluded that Homes Victoria lacked a completed financial-sustainability plan and did not consistently direct new housing toward the locations with the greatest need.

This produces a mixed assessment.

Labor has demonstrated that it can establish, fund and deliver a major social-housing program. It has also undertaken difficult planning reforms intended to increase density and shorten approval times.

But its headline housing targets remain considerably ahead of its demonstrated rate of delivery.

There is a difference between changing a planning scheme to accommodate 800,000 homes and having the finance, workers, infrastructure and market demand required to construct them.

Labor has the most developed machinery. Whether that machinery can operate at the promised scale remains uncertain.

The Liberal–Nationals Coalition: more land, lower taxes and faster approvals

The Victorian Liberal–Nationals Coalition is developing a recognisable supply-side alternative.

Its published proposals include fast-tracking the release of as many as 290,000 residential lots, accelerating approvals in growth areas, expanding Melbourne’s Capital City Zone and promoting greater housing choice.

The Coalition has also proposed abolishing stamp duty for first-home buyers purchasing properties valued at up to $1 million and progressively increasing the land-tax threshold to $300,000.

The underlying argument is straightforward: Victoria will not improve housing affordability unless it allows more homes to be built, reduces delays and makes the state more attractive to purchasers, investors and developers.

There is merit in focusing on planning time, land supply, development costs and confidence. Private industry must deliver most of Victoria’s future housing, so policies that make viable projects easier to commence deserve serious consideration.

However, several questions remain unanswered.

Releasing 290,000 residential lots does not mean that 290,000 homes will be built. Much depends on where the land is, who owns it, when it can be serviced and whether purchasers want to live there.

New communities require roads, drainage, water, sewerage, schools, medical services and public transport. These are expensive and frequently take years to deliver.

Tax reductions also carry a budgetary cost. Stamp duty and land tax are significant sources of Victorian revenue. If they are reduced, a Coalition government would need to explain what revenue would replace them, what expenditure would be reduced, or whether additional borrowing would be required.

The Coalition’s policy may create a larger development pipeline and improve private-sector confidence. But before the election, voters should expect independent costings, clear delivery dates and an explanation of how newly released land will be serviced.

The Coalition may have a potentially useful direction. It must still demonstrate a complete delivery plan.

The Greens: the most ambitious intervention

The Victorian Greens have now published a substantial housing platform.

Their proposals include abolishing stamp duty on owner-occupied homes valued at up to $1.1 million, with reduced duty on homes between $1.1 million and $1.6 million.

They would fund part of this change by increasing land tax on residential property investors holding portfolios valued above $5 million. The Greens estimate this measure would raise approximately $2 billion over four years.

They also propose:

• Building 88,000 public homes.

• Providing an initial $4 billion for public-housing construction, maintenance and upgrades.

• Freezing rents for two years and then limiting increases.

• Requiring developments of 15 or more dwellings to include at least 30% affordable housing.

• Preventing public-housing land from being used for private development.

• Abolishing street auctions.

• Requiring fixed advertised prices and upfront reserve disclosure.

• Changing how agents’ selling fees are structured.

This is not an absence of housing policy. It is a highly interventionist policy that attempts to change public housing, private development, renting, property taxation and the sales process.

Its central difficulty is scale.

Labor’s $5.3 billion Big Housing Build is working toward approximately 12,949 homes, partly through community-housing providers and private-sector partnerships. That does not allow us to calculate a simple per-home cost for every future program, but it demonstrates the enormous capital required.

An initial $4 billion commitment cannot, on its own, finance 88,000 completed public homes. The Greens would therefore need to identify substantial additional funding, land, borrowing capacity and delivery partners.

There is also a workforce question. A very large public-housing construction program would compete for workers and materials with private housing, transport infrastructure, schools, hospitals and existing government projects.

Requiring 30% affordable housing in larger private developments may produce an important social benefit. But if the requirement makes marginal projects financially unviable, it could reduce the total number of developments that proceed. That possibility requires independent feasibility modelling rather than political assertion from either side.

The Greens are asking important questions about affordability, renters and public housing. Their challenge is proving that their funding and the construction industry can support the scale of their ambition.

One Nation: campaigning on housing without a completed Victorian policy

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation intends to contest the Victorian election and is campaigning on housing affordability, government debt, regional development and the cost of living.

However, as at 19 August 2026, One Nation Victoria’s official policy page identifies its housing policy as “Update in Progress.”

The federal party has promoted proposals including a temporary GST exemption for materials used in new homes, reduced government charges and changes to construction requirements.

Those ideas cannot automatically be treated as a Victorian housing policy. GST is a federal tax, while the Victorian election concerns the powers and finances of the state government.

One Nation may publish a detailed Victorian policy before the election. Until it does, it is not possible to assess its housing targets, funding, infrastructure requirements or delivery timetable.

A party can criticise the existing system without yet presenting a costed replacement. Voters interested in housing should expect more than a general promise to reduce debt, regulation or migration.

They should expect a Victorian plan.

The debt no party can ignore

Every housing promise must be considered against Victoria’s financial position.

The 2026–27 Victorian Budget forecasts net debt rising from approximately $165.3 billion in 2025–26 to:

• $175.6 billion in 2026–27

• $183.2 billion in 2027–28

• $191.1 billion in 2028–29

• $199.3 billion in 2029–30

Debt does not mean that Victoria cannot invest in housing. Borrowing to create long-lived, productive assets can be responsible.

But high and rising debt limits flexibility. It increases interest costs and makes large unfunded promises more difficult to accept at face value.

The same Budget forecasts government infrastructure investment declining from $21.4 billion in 2025–26 to approximately $15.3 billion by 2029–30.

That matters because housing cannot be separated from infrastructure. A new subdivision without roads, water, drainage, schools and transport is not a completed community.

Any party promising large volumes of housing must explain whether the state will build the associated infrastructure, require developers to fund it, seek Commonwealth assistance or borrow more.

Where will the workers come from?

Money and planning approvals are only part of the problem.

Jobs and Skills Australia estimated that occupations representing 69% of the construction workforce were experiencing shortages in 2025. These shortages affect builders, electricians, plumbers, engineers, machinery operators and other essential roles.

Housing projects must also compete for workers with major transport projects, renewable-energy infrastructure, hospitals, schools and commercial construction.

No Victorian government can create tens of thousands of experienced tradespeople within one year.

Governments can expand apprenticeships, improve training completion, recognise suitable overseas qualifications and encourage modern construction methods. These are worthwhile long-term responses.

But workforce development takes time.

A housing policy that ignores labour supply is not a delivery policy. It is a target.

What could actually be achieved?

Political parties should be required to explain what their policies will accomplish after one, two and three years—not only after ten or twenty years.

In the first year

A new or returning government could change planning rules, establish accelerated approval pathways, release land, alter property taxes and commence procurement.

It could also identify government land, negotiate infrastructure agreements and begin training initiatives.

These measures could be important, but few would immediately produce completed homes.

Within two years

Victorians could reasonably expect to see more development-ready land, additional planning approvals, public projects under construction and private developments responding to new settings.

This is also when the weaknesses in a policy would start to appear. Projects might be approved but unable to obtain finance. Land might be released but remain unserviced. Public projects might encounter cost escalation, procurement delays or workforce shortages.

Approvals and announced dwelling capacity should not be reported as completed housing.

Within three years

A competent government should be able to demonstrate a measurable increase in commencements and some additional completions, particularly from projects already in the pipeline or located on serviced land.

However, no party is likely to transform Victoria’s housing supply within three years.

Large-scale public housing, new suburbs and major apartment developments frequently require longer periods for planning, finance, infrastructure and construction.

The most credible party will not necessarily promise the fastest transformation. It may be the party prepared to publish realistic milestones and report honestly against them.

What should property professionals look for?

Estate agents encounter the housing system at ground level.

They see first-home buyers unable to compete, tenants struggling to find suitable properties, investors responding to tax and rental regulation, vendors deciding whether to sell, and developers assessing whether projects remain viable.

That experience provides an opportunity—and perhaps a responsibility—to look beyond political headlines.

Property professionals should ask:

• Does the policy increase actual supply or merely purchasing power?

• Does it make development more viable or add costs that prevent projects proceeding?

• Is its public-housing commitment properly funded?

• Does it account for infrastructure and workforce constraints?

• Are its targets measured in approvals, commencements or completions?

• Are its time frames realistic?

• Has the policy been independently costed?

• Is the party promising action within the powers of a Victorian government?

The answers may not point neatly toward one political party.

Labor has the largest established program and the greatest delivery experience, but its results raise doubts about its ability to meet its enormous targets.

The Coalition is proposing planning, land-release and tax reforms that may encourage private supply, but it must demonstrate how infrastructure and revenue consequences will be managed.

The Greens have the most ambitious public and affordable housing agenda, but its scale appears far greater than the initial funding and available construction capacity.

One Nation cannot yet be properly assessed because it has not published a completed Victorian housing policy.

Is This Victoria’s Housing Election?

Housing affects almost every Victorian.

It affects the young person trying to purchase a first home, the family seeking more space, the renter facing another increase, the investor deciding whether to remain in the market, the developer assessing a project and the person waiting for social housing.

Yet the real choice is not which party can make the largest announcement.

It is which party can fund, approve, service and help deliver the homes it promises.

If property, housing affordability and future supply will influence your vote, are you genuinely clear about which party offers the most achievable policy?

Or are you being persuaded by the biggest target, the lowest proposed tax, or the political message you already prefer?

Is this Victoria’s housing election? Perhaps it should be.

Policy information in this article is current as at 19 August 2026 and may change before the Victorian election.

This article is general information for real estate professionals and does not constitute welfare, legal, or financial advice.